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Nationwide study of relations between public
institutions and their clients
The Hungarian Gallup Institute was commissioned by the United
Nations to conduct an articulated investigation of corruption
during the year 2000. Five phases were completed up to the
Autumn of 2000
including a survey conducted among the general
public from the whole of the Hungary in April 2000. The data
collected during personal interviews with a representative
sample of people aged over 18 (N 1839).
In this study Gallup assessed certain public institutions
from the client's or consumer's point of view
in addition
to the recording the perceptions of the population at large.
The Gallup approach presupposes that these public institutions
as state-owned service-providing companies
can be judged
by consumers
in the same way as service-providing companies
operating in the private sector can. Our study focussed on
the willingness of employees to be corrupted
both according
to public perception and as revealed by specific cases
and
we took care to investigate not only the whole public sector
but also individual public institutions.
The interviewees judged 26 public institutions in terms of
the susceptibility of their employees to corruption
using
a five-point scale where "1" means that there is hardly any
likelyhood of having to pay money in return for services and
5
means that it is highly probable that a gratuity will
be required.
see figures!
In Hungary today
well over half the population believe that
if they want proper service in a health care institution they
will probably have to pay a gratuity.
Of the institutions listed
the largest part of the population
thinks that hospital employees are the most likely to receive
gratuities
above all physicians (according to 77% of the
population)
followed by the paramedical staff (62%). Next
come general practitioners with adult patients (59%)
and
specialised children's doctors (58%). There is a national
consensus about hospital physicians
but other health care
workers receive varying judgements: Budapest residents are
far more likely to believe that nurses
general practitioners
and children's doctors receive gratuities than people living
in other parts of the country.
Judgments about police corruption vary widely
depending
on which branch of the police force is examined. Traffic policemen
are considered far more corrupt than officers whose contact
with the public takes place inside police stations.
More than half of Budapest residents assume that traffic
policemen accept bribes when they are on duty
while "only"
one-third of the provincial population thinks so.
In general
people under the age of 30 are far more inclined
than other groups to believe that all state employees
especially
traffic policemen and customs and excise officers
are corrupt.
Over half (55%) of people in the younger age groups think
than traffic policemen accept bribes
but less than one third
(29%) of the over-50 age group thinks so.
The population considers the traffic police and the Customs
and Excise Authority the most corrupt (28-28%) of the various
state institutions and bodies which have dealings with individual
members of the public. A third of Budapest residents and a
quarter of provincial residents assume that traffic police
officers will accept bribes. In the case of the Customs and
Excise Authority the situation is the opposite: they are considered
more corrupt in provincial Hungary than in the capital.
A fifth of the population believes that Ministry officials
officers in other branches of the police
and members of the
Market Supervision Authority have to be bribed to ensure that
affairs are handled "properly".
Local Authorities are considered the least corrupt among
institutions: depending on which department they are asked
about
6-13% of respondents think that municipal employees
are corrupt. Municipal technical departments are considered
to be the most corrupt and education departments the least.
Far more Budapest (20%) than provincial residents (7%) consider
municipal housing departments (formerly known as "IKV" or
Real Estate Management Body) to be corrupt.
Public perceptions of the incidence of corruption in public
institutions
"How typical is it to give a gratuity or tip to the
employees of the following institutions?"
The columns on the right of the table represent segments
of the population
according to residence. Each number shows
the percentage of that segment which answered "typical" or
highly typical
for the category in the left-hand column.
| |
Total
|
Budapest
|
county town
|
other town
|
village
farmstead
|
| Hospital doctors |
77
|
78
|
78
|
81
|
72
|
| Hospital nurses |
62
|
74
|
60
|
56
|
59
|
| General practitioners |
59
|
72
|
50
|
56
|
59
|
| Children's doctors |
58
|
68
|
52
|
56
|
58
|
| Traffic police officers |
39
|
53
|
35
|
33
|
37
|
| Police - Traffic Police Authority |
28
|
36
|
25
|
25
|
27
|
| Customs and Excise Authority |
28
|
23
|
30
|
28
|
29
|
| Ministries |
20
|
14
|
18
|
18
|
25
|
| Police - other branches |
19
|
24
|
13
|
18
|
20
|
| Market Supervision Authority |
18
|
25
|
19
|
12
|
17
|
| Bank Credit Departments |
16
|
14
|
11
|
18
|
19
|
| Traffic Supervision Authority |
16
|
17
|
15
|
16
|
16
|
| Public Grounds Supervision Authority |
14
|
24
|
16
|
10
|
11
|
| State Public Health and Medical Officer
Service |
14
|
18
|
13
|
13
|
12
|
| Consumer Protection Authority |
13
|
14
|
11
|
16
|
13
|
| Courts |
13
|
8
|
8
|
14
|
17
|
| Municipality - Technical Department |
13
|
19
|
14
|
13
|
9
|
| Public notaries |
13
|
13
|
10
|
15
|
13
|
| Inland Revenue Office |
13
|
15
|
10
|
12
|
13
|
| National Health Insurance Fund |
11
|
10
|
9
|
11
|
12
|
| Court of Registration |
11
|
8
|
8
|
12
|
13
|
| Municipality - Property Department |
10
|
13
|
12
|
11
|
8
|
| Municipality - Social Department |
10
|
14
|
10
|
10
|
9
|
| Land Registry |
10
|
11
|
9
|
10
|
11
|
| Municipality - Housing Management |
10
|
20
|
7
|
7
|
8
|
| Social Security Office |
9
|
10
|
9
|
7
|
9
|
| Municipality - Client Relations |
7
|
7
|
8
|
6
|
7
|
| Municipality - Education Department |
6
|
4
|
5
|
7
|
6
|
| Municipality - other |
6
|
3
|
6
|
5
|
7
|
Apart from measuring public perceptions and beliefs
it is
of key importance to establish how much actual contact these
organisations have with individual members of the public.
The study showed that the highest number of respondents
or
their immediate relatives
visit health care institutions
and hospitals during a one-year period (62% and 34% of the
population
respectively). One fifth of the population had
official contacts with the Inland Revenue Office
and somewhat
fewer with the Social Security and Land Registry Offices (16-16%)
in 1999. The most frequently visited branch of the Local Authority
was the customer service department
with its continual
routine
public
tasks (15%)
and the social and welfare departments
offering support and assistance (14%). Other municipal departments
had significantly fewer contacts with the public.
A relatively high number of people (11%).had official contacts
with the police during the past year.
Every tenth adult visited a bank credit department in 1999
while rather fewer visited the National Health Insurance Fund
(8%) or a public notary (8%).
Less than 5% of the population visited other institutions
in 1999 - the Courts
the Public Grounds Supervision Authority
the National Public Health and Medical Officer Service
the
Traffic Supervision Authority
the Customs and Excise Authority
the Ministries
the Court of Registration
the Consumer Protection
Supervision Authority
and the Market Supervision Authority.
These figures indicate that the population's opinion about
health care is generally based on personal experience
since
members of about two-thirds of households visited health care
institutions during the preceding year. The number of people
who had personal contact with the police (11%) also suggests
that many respondents have first-hand experience of police
activities and are not only influenced by the media in their
perceptions.
In the case of other institutions
public beliefs about corruption
- for example in the Customs and Excise Authority
Ministries
and the various supervisory authorities - are based on relatively
few personal experiences. This means that the public image
of these institutions can be highly influenced in both a positive
and negative way by effective public relations and by the
media.
We presume that a non-transparent
system of unwritten rules
over-complicated proceedings
and unclear competencies enable
the employees of public institutions to gain "autonomy"
to
judge cases on an individual basis
and to exercise excessive
power in decision-making
which can lead to minor abuses (favoritism)
or to real corruption in more severe cases.
This is why we consider it important that the operations
of state agencies which do not function on market principles
but which serve the population and enjoy public financing
should nonetheless be judged according to market-related qualitative
criteria
by individual consumers.
Those who were actually in contact with these institutions
in 1999 said that the ones they consulted about the most complicated
issues were the Consumer Protection Supervision Authority
Courts
hospitals
technical departments of local authorities
the Traffic Supervision Authority
the Market Supervision
Authority
credit departments of banks
education departments
of municipalities
the Police and the Customs and Excise Authority.
In our opinion people contacted the Public Grounds Supervision
Authority
Ministries
municipal customer service departments
public notaries
the National Health Care Insurance Fund
the social and welfare and property departments of municipalities
and the traffic police authorities about the least complicated
issues.
In the opinion of consumers
the highest quality service
- in terms of administration
speed
training and efficiency
- was provided by public notaries
municipal customer service
departments
health care institutions (excluding hospitals)
social and welfare departments
and education departments
of municipalities
the National Health Care Insurance Fund
and the State Public Health and Medical Officer Service.
In 1999 clients were least satisfied with services provided
by municipal housing departments
the Public Grounds Supervision
Authority
Courts
the Police
the Market Supervision Authority
and the Consumer Protection Supervision Authority.
*
People actually involved in official contacts with institutions
found civil servants far less likely to accept bribes than
would be suggested by the opinions of the public at large.
The proportion of people expecting a gratuity in return for
services is the highest in health care institutions (see below
for the actual sums given as gratuities in health care).
In other institutions relatively fewer people felt that they
were expected to give tips. The behavior of employees of the
Traffic Supervision Authority
the Public Grounds Supervision
Authority
the National Public Health and Medical Officer
Service
the traffic police
the Customs and Excise Authority
the Consumer Protection Supervision Authority
Ministries
municipal housing departments
and the Market Supervision
Authority indicated the greatest willingness to be corrupted
(according to 7-12% of consumers).
see figures!
Driving offences and traffic contraventions constitute one
of the key sources and areas of "street corruption" in Hungary.
The way in which such offences are dealt with is difficult
to monitor
the conversation has no witnesses
and the relevant
documents can be manipulated freely by the officers involved.
Thus the survey of the general population included questions
about whether the respondents or their close relatives had
been stopped by the police because of a driving-related offence
and how the occasion ended.
12% of respondents were stopped by policemen because of a
driving-related offence in 1999. 41% of these cases ended
in a rather peculiar way: 27% did not have to pay a fine
although they had committed the offence
while 14% paid but
did not receive a ticket or receipt.
see figure!
Budapest residents are far ahead of provincial residents
in terms both of traffic offences and of cases involving suspicious
behaviour: 18% of them violated traffic rules and over one
fifth (22%) of them bribed the police officer on duty instead
of paying a fine - in other words
they payed the fine on
the spot without being given a receipt.
see figure!
If we extrapolated from these representative sample ratios
to the actual population
we could conclude that nationwide
there were a total of about 61
000 cases of traffic police
officers accepting bribes in 1999.
This estimate is
if anything
rather conservative
because
it does not include repeated occasions within the same family
and it ignores the fact that some sort of corruption must
have taken place in many of the cases where a driver committed
an offence but left the scene without making any kind of payment.
*
In our opinion health care represents a unique field with
respect to corruption
and solving the problem of tipping
or gratuity-giving is far more than a mere penal issue - although
when taken to excess the custom can lead to genuine crimes.
Nearly 80% of the population thinks that receiving gratuities
is a characteristic of hospital doctors. According to nearly
two-thirds of the sample
gratuities are typically given to
other health care workers
hospital nurses
general practitioners
and children's doctors.
see figure!
Only 18% of people who gave gratuities did not feel that
they were expected to do so. In other words more than 80%
of gratuity-payers in the sample felt that they would not
receive proper treatment unless they paid.
Members of one third (34%) of households made use of hospital
services in 1999. 40% of the households concerned gave an
average of 1914 Hungarian forints to the hospital staff and
52% gave an average of 8845 forints to doctors. As mentioned
before a somewhat lower proportion mentioned in both cases
that they were expected to pay a gratuity.
see figure!
Members of 62% of households went for specialized health
care consultations. 13% of these households gave an average
of 1164 forints to the hospital staff
26% gave on average
2683 forints to doctors. Thus the estimated total of gratuities
paid in 1999 comes to at least 9
333 billion forints
not
including sums given to family GPs
multiple occurrences within
the same family and cases outside the immediate household
(for example when a gratuity is given to the doctor who treats
a grandmother living alone).
see figure!
*
In order to understand the phenomenon of active and passive
corruption and to explore real-life situations
we must also
understand the general moral attitudes of society.
The acceptance of a gratuity in return for performing an
obligation is something that has never been accepted by the
vast majority of society. At the same time it is interesting
to note that 29% of the population still seem to be tolerant
about this passive form of corruption. It seems to make little
difference whether we ask state employees or people working
in the private sector. The value systems of civil servants
do not appear to differ much from those of groups working
in other sectors: the former do not display moral attitudes
which differ significantly from the general norm
even in
situations when they are acting in their official capacity.
In our opinion there is no point in focussing separately on
the moral behavior of civil servants / public officials as
distinct social groups
because the common moral capital of
the whole of society affects the behaviour of public sector
workers as much as it affects anybody else.
Cases considered as "corruption"
| |
Percentage
of the population
|
| Civil servants or politicians tolerating
organized criminal activities in return for an appropriate
reward |
94%
|
| Obtaining posts
supply contracts or work
contracts for national or local authorities by bribing
official decisionmakers |
93%
|
| Civil servants dealing with cases only
in return for bribes or gratuities |
92%
|
| Traffic policemen accepting bribes instead
of issuing properly receipted fines |
82%
|
| Jobs
municipal or national contracts and
orders allocated on the basis of friendship or family
relationships |
81%
|
| Having to use connections or "godfathers"
in order to get things arranged |
75%
|
| Civil servants or public officials committing
minor contraventions for the benefit of family members |
63%
|
| Civil servant or public officials accepting
small gifts from clients |
45%
|
| Gratuities given to doctors |
28%
|
| Tips |
20%
|
Generally it can be said that social attitudes towards corruption
are highly differentiated. Virtually the whole of society
agrees that the dishonest management of affairs in politics
and business should be considered as corruption. However
a large part of the population is not nearly so convinced
about "everyday" corruption: about civil servants favouring
family members
about the "promotional" activities that the
market sector directs towards civil servants
about giving
gratuities to doctors or tipping people.
(Gallup Hungary
October 2000)
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