Gallup Monitor - Á. Farkas: Analysis of the International Anti-Corruption

Ákos Farkas:

Analysis of the International Anti-Corruption Campaign Documents with Special Regard to the Accession of Hungary to the European Union

A few Characteristics of the International Anti-Corruption Campaign
The OECD Convention
The Convention of the Council of Europe against Bribery
The Characteristics of Anti-Corruption Measures in the European Union
The EU-Accession of Hungary and the Internal Anti-Corruption Regulations

I. A few Characteristics of the International Anti-Corruption Campaign

1. It is an undeniable fact that the concept of corruption has shown different characteristics in different time periods, however, its general features have been especially distinct in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Above all, the present-day campaign against corruption is concentrated on corruption related to the international economy, even if it may have an effect on other societal dimensions.

Economic corruption is a consequence of the internationalization of the economy and the violation of the written or unwritten rules of the international economic competition.

As a result of a long process, economic competition and the protection of legal regulations have elicited the demand for criminal legislation in most countries. This requirement was met by the various national penal codes through the creation of various special legal categories (economic, competition, tax and bankruptcy legislation). However, these were intended primarily for the protection of irregularities in the internal markets. The limited applicability of national laws, the dissimilar nature of the criminal substantive regulatory concepts, the difference in the procedural rules impeded the international cooperation.

2. Anti-corruption action at an international level is fundamentally the product of the second half of the 70-s, gaining its first momentum in the USA during the Carter Administration as a result of the moral crisis due to the Watergate affair. The initial step was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which, apart from other provisions, declared the bribery of a foreign public official having competence in economic decision-making in the interest of a business transaction to be punishable by law. Initially, this legislation was not followed by other countries, resulting in the temporary weakening of the position of US companies in the economic competition abroad.

This negative effect motivated the US business community to exert pressure on Congress. This resulted in the 1988 Amendment to the Corruption Act as well as the urge for international action against corruption. Since the first objective was to diminish the role of corruption in international trade, the establishment of cooperation within the scope of the OECD seemed to be the logical step. However, this process was initially slow. The achievement of the first measures for the creation of the first common platform continued from 1989 to 1994. In that latter year, on May 24th, 1994, the OECD Council accepted the recommendation for combating bribery in international business transactions. As a result of this recommendation, in almost all member countries of the OECD, the bribable public officials attained persona non grata status in the business life during the economic globalization period of the 90-s. This process led to the Convention of 1997 ratified by the Hungarian Legislature as well, rendering the bribery of foreign public officials and functionaries punishable by law.

3. The campaign against corruption was continued simultaneously at other forums as well, including the Council of Europe, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, various economic organizations (International Chamber of Commerce, World Bank ) and non-governmental organizations (Transparency International). Efforts made within the scope of the Council of Europe in 1994 and the EU in 1995 had the objective to bring about international agreements against corruption. Transparency International as an international non-governmental organization was specifically organized in 1994 with the purpose of combating corruption.

4. The importance of anti-corruption action is also indicated by the various documents published and conferences organized within the scopes of the above named forums, starting in the second half of the 70-s. The Council of the International Chamber of Commerce accepted the report on "Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions" on November 29th 1997. The United Nations organized a 1989 conference on the subject in The Hague, but this was one of the themes of the VIII. United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders organized in September, 1990, in Cuba, where the resolution "Corruption in Government" was adopted. The IX. United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention (Cairo, 1995) devoted a significant portion of its activity to the problem of corruption. The various international anti-corruption conferences made significant contributions as well (1983 Washington; 1985 New York; 1987 Hong Kong; 1989 Sydney; 1992 Amsterdam; 1993 Cancun, Mexico; 1995 Beijing). A conference on corruption in transforming economies was held in January, 1994, in Budapest. In the same year, in February, an interdisciplinary conference was organized in Fribourg, Switzerland, and in February, 1995, an OECD symposium was held on corruption and proper government practices. However, the most significant contribution was given by the OECD recommendation on bribery in international business transactions accepted in February, 1994.

5. The cooperation was not limited to measures against economic corruption, since the role of corruption is not confined to the violation of the fair economic competition rules. Corruption is a concomitant symptom of several, cross-border criminal activities (corrupt financial practice, fraud, organized crime, drug trade, etc.) as well, consequently, international cooperation in these areas is equally justified.

6. In this context, the (at least partial) elimination of the differences in the corruption regulations of various member countries is attempted.

There are differences regarding which persons are considered to be public officials/functionaries in the individual countries. In some states, Members of the Parliament and the Cabinet do not fall into this category.
The legal systems regarding criminal responsibility may differ as well. Most countries do not recognize the criminal responsibility of an artificial person. Responsibility based on the length of the bribery chain may vary, as well. In some countries, only the official receiving the payoff is responsible, even if the bribe is intended for his influencing the decision of a third party in favor of the briber.
Despite the different national approaches it was common to all countries that the bribery of foreign functionaries and officials of international organizations was not considered to be a crime.

7. The above named forums implemented different approaches to the problems of corruption. While for instance the OECD considers the prevention of corruption in international economic transactions to be its essential objective, the European Union lays the emphasis on the corruption-free nature of its own economic and decision-making procedures, and, consequently, the sectoral measures against corruption, the Council of Europe prefers universal criminal measures against corruption in the (public and private) economy, politics and civil sphere.

8. Despite the above, the various international conventions have some common characteristics, as well.

The first is that the destructive role of corruption in the international economy and business is accentuated.
The second is that corruption is not considered to be a criminal problem only, since the provisions of tax law and rules regarding auditing are also included, but criminal law is regarded to play a prominent role in combating corruption.
The third is that the convention of every organization considers the transparency, traceability and controllability of the economic and administrative decision-making processes to be of utmost importance.
The fourth is that apart from the importance of individual responsibility, each convention emphasizes the collective responsibilities of business organizations. At the present time, penal aspects of this are becoming more and more noticeable in the national codification efforts.

9.The conventions analyzed here have all been established within the scopes of large and influential international organizations.

It is important to emphasize this because these organizations play a decisive role in the adoption and ratification of the international conventions created by them. The various countries have serious interest in attaining memberships in these organizations, therefore they have to meet several requirements as conditions of acceptance. Should they fail to satisfy those requirements, the otherwise lengthy process of admission will be prolonged even more because of the unfavorable evaluation. In case of the member countries, regular monitoring and political sanctions guarantee the pressure. In this regard, it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of a simple political recommendation regarding legislation or a courteous request for ratification. It is definitely advisable to take the recommendations and the conventions seriously.

II. The OECD Convention

1. The international convention concluded on November 27th, 1997, signed by the Hungarian Government on December 17th, 1997, and ratified by the Legislature on November 29th, 1998, consists of 17 sections under the title: "On Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions" (hereinafter called: Convention). The Convention designates regulatory limits without suggesting a textual norm or determines common rules for the signatory states. These are outlined below:

The rules of the Convention respect the national legal systems of the individual member countries and do not impose the requirement of harmonization of laws.
Perhaps the most important principle of the convention lies in its functional approach. The importance is not in making the rules identical but in rendering the character, nature, and effects of the measures taken by member countries commensurable, comparable and 'functionally equivalent'.

This requirement concerns:

the concept of bribery,
the definition of functionaries (1. Section),
the responsibilities of artificial persons (2.Section),
the imposition of sanctions (3. Section)

According to the Convention, the concept of bribery is the active bribery of a foreign official, and its intended objective is only the regulation of the criminal responsibility of the briber, it does not stipulate the criminalization of passive bribery. It requires the criminal evaluation of collective criminal formations (aiding and abetting) as well. Preparations and attempts for bribery are included only in the event that the preparations or attempts are punishable by national law as well.

The concept of official includes any person holding office or public function in a foreign state in the legislative, executive, judicial branches of power by election or appointment including public office and state-owned companies, or any official or emissary of an international organization. (The foreign state concept includes both central and local administrative organs thereof.)

The convention renders the concept of responsibility of artificial persons subject to regulation as well, it stipulates for the participating states to take the necessary measures in order to establish the responsibility of artificial persons, with due consideration to the domestic legal principles regarding responsibility. The convention does not restrict the forms of responsibility to criminal liability. All forms of responsibility are acceptable.

The Convention narrows down the sanctions applicable against natural persons committing bribery to criminal sanctions, a fundamental requirement for which is to be effective, proportionate and to serve as a deterrent.

These expectations are valid for sanctions against artificial persons as well, the only difference is that the Convention does not impose limitations regarding the definition of the nature of sanctions. They may belong to the criminal as well as to other legal category.

2. The Convention imposes only one particular limitation in connection with the investigation of corruption cases and the accusation: they may not be influenced by considerations regarding economic interests of the country in question (Section 5)

3. The Convention stipulates the formulation of criminal regulations regarding money laundering connected to bribes and its prosecution regardless of the location of perpetration. (Section 7)

4. The Convention attaches great importance to public, accurate and clear regulations pertaining to accounting, auditing and financial records rendering financial-economic transactions, money flow, statements, cost accounting authentic and verifiable. In view of this, special importance is attached to the establishment of civil, administrative, criminal liability and sanction forms for the non-preparation or falsification of business books, records, statements of accounts and financial reports (Section 8).

5. The Convention imposes a requirement for immediate and the most comprehensive mutual judicial assistance as permitted by the regulations in which events opinions regarding double incrimination for acts under the ruling of the Convention must be submitted. In corruption cases, judicial assistance may not be refused based on the protection of banking secrets. (Section 9.).

6. In the event of criminal acts under the ruling of the Convention, extradition may not be refused, even if the country has no extradition treaty with the state requesting extradition. Every state participating in the convention must take the appropriate measures for extradition or the prosecution of persons guilty of bribery. (Section 10)

7. The Convention has established a Working Group responsible for supervising the compliance with provisions included therein and in the attached Recommendations of November 21. 1997, serving as interpretation for the stipulations of the Convention. This Working Group investigates on a regular basis whether participating countries fulfill their obligations.

8. This investigation was performed with respect to the Hungarian regulatory enactments, as well. Concurrently with the ratification of the Convention, Hungary amended its Penal Code by Act LXXXVIII.of 1998, and the new Title VIII. On Criminal Acts Against Morality in International Public Life was inserted to Chapter XV. containing provisions regarding public administration, jurisdiction and the morality in public life. Section 258/B of this regulates the criminal act of bribery in international relationships. Without going into details I wish to emphasize that the already existing factual elements of bribery have been adapted in the regulation, this corresponds to the requirements of the convention. Moreover, it goes beyond those requirements since it stipulates renders passive bribery punishable by law, as well. (Section 258/D)

VIII. Title
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST THE MORALITY IN PUBLIC LIFE AT AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Bribery in International Context

258/B. § (1) Any person giving or promising preference to a foreign official or another person with regard to thereof, influencing him/her in his/her activity to the detriment of the public interest, is guilty of misdemeanor and is punishable by imprisonment up to two years.
(2) The briber is guilty of felony and punishable by imprisonment up to three years, in the event that the preference is given or promised influencing the foreign official to breach his/her official duties, to act ultra vires or to otherwise abuse his/her official position.
(3) The perpetrator of the criminal act pursuant to Subsection (1) is not punishable in the event that the preference was given or promised on the initiative of the foreign official, because he/she could fear illegitimate detriment as a result of his/her non-cooperation.

258/C. § (1) Any person giving or promising preference to the member of a foreign economic organization or another person with regard to thereof, influencing him/her to breach his/her duties, is guilty of misdemeanor and punishable by imprisonment up to one year, communal work or a fine.
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment up to two years in the event that preference is given or promised to an employer, or member empowered to make independent decisions in a foreign economic organization.

258/D. § (1) The foreign public official pursuant to Subsections 258/F. § 1. c)-e) requesting preference in connection with his/her function or accepting the preference or a promise thereof, or agreeing with the person requesting or accepting the preference, is guilty of felony and punishable by imprisonment up to three years.
(2) The perpetrator is punishable by imprisonment from one to five years in the event that he/she breaches his/her official duties, acts ultra vires or otherwise abuses his/her official position in exchange for the preference, or he/she commits the acts within the scope of racketeering or for regular material gains.

Profiteering from Influence at an International Level

258/E. § Any person requesting or accepting preference with regard to his influence on a foreign official is guilty of felony and punishable by imprisonment up to three years.

Interpretatory Provision

258/F. § In the context of this Title
1. Foreign official is defined as:

Any person appointed or elected to legislative, judiciary or public administrative position in a foreign state.
Any person having administrative duties or duties related to the power of the state at an administrative organ or an organ related to the power of the state in a foreign country.
Any person performing services at international organizations established by international agreement the function of whom pertains to the proper operation of the organization.
Any elected member of a general assembly or official body of an international organization
Any member of an International Court having jurisdiction within the territory of the Republic of Hungary of over the citizens thereof, any person serving at said International Court whose function pertains to the proper operation of the Court.

2. Foreign economic organization is any organization with legal status based on its personal right, and is authorized to perform economic activity in the given organizational form. The Working Group has voiced overall satisfaction with respect to the regulation.

However, it has expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that Subsection 258/B § (3) - although in accordance with the effective criminal regulations pertaining to bribery - has created grounds for eliminating the punishability of a briber committing the criminal act on the initiative of the foreign public official because of fear of illegitimate detriment. The Working Group considers this ruling as an obstacle to the effectiveness of the Convention, therefore it proposes its annulment.
It has also been criticized that the opportunity for the confiscation of any material gain arising from the bribery - stipulated by the Convention - even with regard to bribery - F.Á - has been only given in the event of imprisonment and not in the event of fines.
The term of limitation for punishability , which amounts to three years according to rules in the general section - in the event of criminal acts punishable by imprisonment of three years or less - has also been found short. The Hungarian explanation, that any measure to prosecute the crime on behalf of the authorities interrupts the term of limitation so that it starts anew, was not found satisfactory. Its acceptance will be considered upon comparison with the regulations passed in other countries.
Last, but not least, it was subjected to criticism that the laws pertaining to the responsibility of artificial persons had not been enacted yet. The Working Group has urged Hungary to solve this problem as soon as possible.

III. The Convention of the Council of Europe against Bribery

1. In the mid-nineties, the Council of Europe entered the field of anti-corruption campaign. The 19. Conference of the Ministers of Justice of the European Council held in 1994, in La Valetta, Malta accepted proposals for combating corruption. Following this event, the first step was the formation of the Multidisciplinary Group (hereinafter called: Group) on Corruption in 1995, later, in 1996 , the European Council adopted an anti-corruption action program. The resolution passed at the 21. Prague Conference of the Ministers of Justice in 1997 urged the fast implementation of that program. As it is apparent from the working concept created by us, the Group considered the creation of the legal framework for the most comprehensive international anti-corruption action to be its principal task. At the commencement of their activity, corruption was regarded by them, as an action in which "persons working in the public or private sphere breach their duties related to public office, private employment, independent status, or other similar relations in order to gain illegitimate advantage for themselves or for other persons".

However, it considered not only the formulation of an international agreement to be its objective but also the promotion and evaluation of anti-corruption measures on behalf of individual states. For this purpose, it submitted a proposal in April, 1998 for the creation of GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption), which was approved by Resolution 98/7 by the Committee of Ministers of the European Council. The essential objective of the GRECO group is to "give substantial contributions to the effective prevention of corruption and to the dynamic process facilitating the anti-corruption campaign. Through collective situation evaluation and multiple-side pressure, GRECO can monitor compliance with the Guiding Directives in an effective and flexible way. Presently, the GRECO Group has 25 member states. The latest country to join was the USA in this year. The first evaluation of the anti-corruption measures taken by individual countries will be performed in 2000-2001. The anti-corruption measures of Hungary will be subjected to thorough examination in 2001.

As a result of the Group's activity, the European Council adopted the Convention on Criminal Law on January 27th, 1999 (hereinafter called Convention). So far, the Convention has been signed by 29 states but (as of the completion of the study) it has only been ratified by 5 states (Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, Slovenia and Macedonia). Ratification by 14 states is required for its entry into force.

2. Article 42 of the Convention addresses the whole range of the various forms of corruption. Its stipulations classify both active and passive corruption to be punishable by criminal law, therefore they show a preference for criminal sanctions. This also means that the Convention follows the principle of 'functional equivalence ' (see. II/1/b) only in a limited sense.

3. The following persons are classified among perpetrators of acts of corruption

domestic or foreign officials, who are members of organs with judicial or administrative powers
participants of the private business sector whether individual enterpreneurs of employees of business organizations,
employees of international organizations
members of international parliamentary bodies, supranational organizations
officials and judges of international courts (Article 2-11.)

4. Trading of and profiteering from influence, money laundering and accounting activities aiding corruption are also listed as acts to be rendered punishable. (Article 12-14)

5. The Convention stipulates the punishability of acts committed as accessory to corruption as well (Article 15)

6. With respect to the responsibility of artificial persons, it takes a definite stand in favor of criminal liability, as opposed to the OECD Convention. It is especially emphasized that the criminal liability of an artificial person does not exempt the perpetrating natural person from criminal liability. (Article 18)

7. With regard to the punishment - similarly to the Convention - it stipulates the effective, proportionate punishment of a deterrent nature, where in case of a natural person, the necessity of imprisonment is emphasized. The only exemption from criminal sanction is allowed in case of artificial persons, where it makes the imposition of a non-criminal sanction possible, including financial sanctions (Article 19).

8. Among procedural aspects, the necessity for protection of cooperating persons (informers) and witnesses and the opportunity to use special investigational methods to uncover any benefit or assets stemming from or related to corruption are mentioned separately.

9. In spite of the fact that the Hungarian legislation has not ratified the Convention yet, it gave its stipulations due consideration when amending the rules of the Penal Code in 1999. These amendments were included to the Penal Code along with the rules of the OECD Convention. An additional provision with respect to the stipulations of the convention is the fact of criminality of profiteering from influence in an international relationship.

10. The Council of Europe accepted another convention related to civil law on April 11, 1999, in which questions related to compensation for civil damages caused by corruption and the responsibility for such damages were settled. The analysis of this latter convention is beyond the scope of the current study.

IV. The Characteristics of Anti-Corruption Measures in the European Union

1. The formulation of the anti-corruption regulations of the European Union was characterized by the uniform opinion that corruption is detrimental to the interest of the Union, because it

undermines healthy decision making
distorts competition and infringes on the principle of free market
damages the monetary interests of the European Community
exerts a negative influence on foreign policy of states receiving aid
is contrary to the open and clear nature of international trade

2. The campaign against corruption can be noticed in two areas. One is Pillar I the other is Pillar III. Pillar Three is the area of cooperation concerning internal and judicial affairs, this is a pillar of intergovernmental cooperation the principal instrument of which is the creation of conventions. Cooperation in internal and judicial affairs is wide-ranging. Cooperation with respect to criminal law falls into this category as well. Anti-corruption regulations emerged along these lines. 3. The first measure was taken in connection with the protection of monetary interests. This was called for by the necessity for the protection of the single internal market created on January 1, 1993. The European Union has its own budget the extent of which amounts to one hundred thousand million euros (ca. twenty-five-thousand billion forints) per annum ca. 10% of which is - based on conservative estimates - acquired by fraud. This crime is not the turf of lone criminals. Influencing complicated financial and administrative operations is impossible without involving and/or bribing the decision-makers. The first step to curb the illegal cash outflow was the Council of Europe Resolution on June 12th, 1994 about the protection of the monetary interests of the Communities.

The resolution formulated the following principles:

Member states must define the concept of (subsidy-related) fraud and its formations.
the necessary sanctions must be determined,
Member states must assume responsibility for the prosecution of subsidy-related fraud and related bribery, in case an official of the EC was a participant of the said crime.
The regulations of member states related to money laundering must be extended to the protection of monetary interests as well.

4. The resolution was followed by the anti-fraud convention created on July 26th, 1995 on a Spanish initiative. One protocol attached to the convention addresses corruption related to fraud. The protocol defines the conceptual elements of corruption and the possible perpetrators. The concept is given a narrow interpretation when it is connected to financially corrupt practices. However, it proposes that member states do not discriminate in the adjudication of acts of corruption between EU officials and those of member states.

5. The campaign against corruption did not stop at acts connected to subsidy-related fraud, since the III. Pillar cooperation regarding criminal prosecution concerns many criminal acts other than fraud. Consequently, the dimension of corruption is much more extended as well. In view of this, the anti-corruption convention of the EU was created in 1997 that shows deviations from the supplementary protocol of the anti-fraud convention in two directions. The first one is that the anti-corruption campaign is disentangled from the framework of monetary interests, the other one is that cooperation is extended to the area of public administration. This signifies that participants of the conventions are obliged to cooperate even in cases where corruption is not subject to criminal prosecution, consequently it declares an all-out, total war on corruption, irrespective of the scope of the anti-corruption campaigns influenced by traditions or other factors in the member states.

6. Similarly to the Convention of the Council of Europe it raises the demand of criminal prosecution of both active and passive corruption. In comparison with the documents described above, public officials working in the EU institutions give the reference point of the Convention.

In 1997, the scope of this was determined in detail by the report on the interpretation of the anti-corruption convention prepared by Council of the EU by listing the institutions established by community law employing EC officials. Such are for example:

the European Investment Bank, the European Monetary Institute,
the European Cooperation Agency,
the European University Institute in Florence,
the European Investment Fund

7. The convention does not address the criminal liability of artificial persons, it only imposes requirements regarding the criminal liability of the manager of a business enterprise, as opposed to the supplementary protocol of the convention on protecting financial interests that calls for the regulation of the liability (not necessarily criminal) of an artificial person.

8. The requirements of the Convention imposed for punishments do not differ from the conventions explained before.

9. However, one difference is that it supports the "ne bis in idem" principle missing from the other agreements.

10. On December 23rd, 1998, a Joint Action program was attached to the convention addressing the measures against active or passive corruption in the private sector. The joint action program takes a stand in favor of the liability and sanctionability of artificial persons. The following are listed among the sanctions: exclusion from financial assistance and support, prohibition of commercial activity, court supervision and liquidation by court.

11.The Maastricht (MT) and the Amsterdam (AT) Treaties intended to realize the protection of the monetary interests of the Union within the framework of Pillar I with instruments of administrative law. This is indicated by Article 280. of the MT modified by the AT. At the moment, this excludes the applicability of criminal law in this area.

12. Independent of this, some steps have been taken for the creation of protection involving criminal law since 1995. As a result, a bill (Corpus Juris, CJ) was developed by a group of European legal experts in 1997 on the authority of the XX. Directorate General of the EU Commission. This bill defines criminal acts detrimental to the monetary interests of the EU, rules of responsibility, sanctions and procedural rules This document was modified as a result of a large-scale feasibility study, and according to the recommendations of the conference of experts held in May, 1999, in Florence.

13. The CJ regulates the aspects of corruption pertaining to criminal law in relation to the protection of monetary interests. Apart from corruption, the illegal use of monetary funds and the abuse of authority related to various funds are regulated as acts similar to corruption. Within the scope of responsibility, the criminal responsibility of artificial persons is regulated.

14. The provisions of CJ was heavily disputed by the member states, some have rejected it, but on account of the corruption scandals of the recent years it has ended up in the center of interest as one possible Pillar I instrument for the protection of monetary interests. The Monetary Commission of the European Parliament described the CJ rules besides the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor as normative in its proposal on account of the protection of monetary interests. In an opinion of January 20th, 2000, the Commission of the EU proposed the modification of the union agreement to facilitate Pillar I protection by criminal legislation. This opinion was elucidated in detail in the September commission statement. The contract modification, the new articles 280 and 280a would make possible to resort to the instruments of criminal law for the protection of monetary interests. The proposal is part of the agenda of the next session of the intergovernmental conference.

15. As a result of a possible modification, it would become possible to create penal regulations (through a decree, if necessary) for the protection of monetary interests that would be directly binding on the member states.

V. The EU-Accession of Hungary and the Internal Anti-Corruption Regulations

1. A central concept of EU legislation and the application of laws in the "acquis communautaire", the "community achievements" the system of those common rights and responsibilities connecting the member states of the European Union. These community achievements extend to the whole range of the EU system of cooperations and, according to regulations, the deviation from these is only permitted under exceptional circumstances and with limited scope.

2. The Pillar III cooperation has its own community achievements as well. The whole range of Pillar III legal sources (conventions, resolutions, joint actions, standpoints, European Council decisions) are found among these. Pillar III cooperation has its community achievements, as well. In this field the equivocal decision of the member states is the key to the creation and acceptance of joint regulations.

3. In case of the future member states however, the acceptance of individual documents may not be subject to deliberation, since one condition of the successful EU-accession is the ratification of conventions containing Pillar III community achievements.

4. The EU has published the list of the documents the acceptance of which is mandatory for states joining the Union. I only wish to emphasize some of these, in particular the questions of cooperation regarding organized crime, fraud, corruption and criminal cases imposing requirements on domestic legislation.

The following fall into this category

The EUROPOL Convention of July 26,
The convention for the protection of the EU monetary interests and its supplementary protocols adopted on the same day, and
the convention of May 26, 1997 on anti-corruption campaign and its supplementary protocols.
the convention on simplified extradition procedures among EU member states adopted on March 10, 1995, and
the convention of September 27, 1996 on extradition among EU member states.

The list goes on, of course. The emphasis is justified by the fact that the adoption of the above named conventions is mandatory for the states that are candidates for membership. Although ratification has not been stipulated yet, but because they wish to increase the tendency for ratification on behalf of the member states, this is only a matter of time.

5. Duties to be fulfilled at the commencement of the accession negotiations related to domestic internal legislation have been determined by the March 5, 1998 98/259/EC Council Decision: those short-term and medium term priorities, the compliance with which is a condition of accession. I only wish to emphasize those relevant to our topic.

Among others, the decision has designated as medium term (to be performed within more than one year) administrational and judicial tasks the creation of the anti-fraud unit, the increase of the effectiveness of the justice system, the legal education of judges, prosecutors, policeman and border guards. The war on organized crime and corruption is designated in connection with cooperation concerning internal and judicial affairs.

6. Apart from the generally positive statements of the country evaluation published on October 13th, 1999, it encourages further progress in protection of the monetary interests of the European Union that is attainable by signing the convention of 1995 and its supplementary protocols intended for protection of the monetary interests. This includes the acceptance of the corruption protocol as well. In other respects, the evaluation has expressed satisfaction regarding the regulation of acts of corruption to date. Nevertheless it is evident that the Hungarian regulation quoted above - the concept of an official - does not correspond entirely to the content of the interpretative provision of the Convention with respect to the protection of the EU monetary interests. The other objective is the satisfactory regulation of the criminal responsibility (and responsibilities pertaining to other branches of law) of artificial persons.

7. With a possible modification of the "MSZ" Hungary must be prepared that the EU creates directly binding norms in the field of criminal law. It seems that the bell will soon toll for this last bastion of sovereignty, as well.